Philosophy and war appear to have little in common; however, it is philosophy that establishes the justifications, or rationalizations for going to war and which attempts to set norms for how wars are conducted. The idea is to establish a moral and ethical foundation for mankind’s most destructive activities. Just War principles define the ethical basis for going to war, while international agreements, namely the Geneva Conventions, define the rules of conduct during war.

Not surprisingly, there is a chasm between the theoretical and practical. Recent events have focused global attention on this chasm as various interests seek to assert justification for the activities. A second aspect of war theory involves the principles of warfighting and the strategic concepts used in the attempt to defeat and enemy.

Some of these concepts are controversial and clash with Just War theory and/or the Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, rebels, insurgents and terrorists often disavow or ignore either set of principles, arguing that they are rules established by states and for states to provide an advantage over non-state actors. Dissidents can argue that states ignore or manipulate the rules when it suits their interests and have a track record of hypocrisy with devastating consequences; most commonly cited examples are the World War II allied bombing campaigns against German cities, and the use of the atomic bomb against civilian targets in Japan.

Principles of the Just War

1. A just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.

2. A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.

3. A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause (although the justice of the cause is not sufficient--see point #4). Further, a just war can only be fought with "right" intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.

4. A war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.

5. The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.

6. The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.

7. The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.

Source: Vincent Ferraro, Professor of International Politics, Mt. Holyoke College

Instant chasm. Certainly everyone would agree with principle number 1, then the dispute begins. Only legitimate authorities can wage war, not individuals and groups. Meanwhile, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the people’s right to self-determination, and that where governments deny such basic human rights, people are justified in over-throwing the government, or establishing their own separate government.

Arguably, the American Revolution was an unjust war, as are virtually all revolutionary struggles in history. In the attempt to establish “legitimacy” dissidents strive to demonstrate that they have the support of large numbers of people and that as their representative they have legitimate authority. Since many rulers are not elected and simply assert a right to rule, some dissidents do likewise. The American founders, however, issued their Declaration of Independence, asserting the wrongs suffered and establishing their legitimacy, ultimately recognized by foreign powers. In 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a Declaration of Jihad Against Christians and Jews, issued by the World Islamic Front (WIF), outlining the wrongs perpetrated against their followers.

Regardless of the declarations a propaganda battle usually ensues to discredit or validate the claims of legitimacy. This can be seen vividly in the current debates surrounding the US war with Iraq.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America

Recognizing the principles of Just War, President George W. Bush included explanations of the justifications for the global war on terror in policy statement defining the current National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued after the attacks of September 11, 2001. “For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.

Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.

Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means.

They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare.

As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.

To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.

Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

· Build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;

· Coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and;

· Continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.”

Full text: National Security Strategy of the United States of America

PDF http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
HTML http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

The Global War on Terror

After 9/11 there was no question about the justification for retaliating against the Islamist terrorists. “A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered” and clearly retaliation and war were just. In fact, the World Islamic Front (WIF) had declared war first, in 1998. That declaration was issued by Shaykh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin (individually) and by Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt, Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh.

Presumably, these are the organizations responsible for 9/11 and against whom the war on terror was declared. The U.S. Government, however, has added any groups or individuals that harbor or support the terrorists, or that conduct attacks against U.S. forces, citizens, or interests, thus broadening the war to global scope, diluting the focus and obscuring the definition of victory. U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan deposed the Taliban regime, hunted bin Laden and al-Qaeda and has attempted to restore peace in a land that had none.

American troops were also sent to the Philippines to pursue Abu-Sayyaf terrorists responsible for numerous attacks and allied with al-Qaeda, though not a signatory to the WIF declaration. Since then official rhetoric has targeted numerous other organizations deemed to be international terrorists. This raises questions about whether a state can declare war on a non-state group that is not a “legitimate authority.” The argument is that war is an inappropriate response to illegal acts that would be better addressed as law enforcement operations. The differences are extremely important.

For example: Declaring war on all organizations listed as international terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department includes such groups as Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatists in Northern Spain. Presumably, the U.S. could justify sending troops into Spain, with or without approval by the Spanish government, an act of war against Spain. Clearly, this is not the intent, but where does one draw the line and how does one justify or get approval for military operations in foreign countries? A law enforcement approach is far more acceptable and feasible, utilizing existing channels for cooperation that exclude military forces.

America is not the only country facing the dilemma of fighting terrorism. Russia faces similar problems with Chechen terrorists. Their military response has done little to quell the uprising, but has escalated the conflict to a point where terrorists are bombing Russian airliners and subways and taking hostages and killing innocents in schools and theatres. The Israeli military response to terrorism has continued to fan the flames of violence with no hope in sight. In Sri Lanka government forces that once confronted a modest armed separatist movement militarily, now face a sophisticated rebel army and navy.

Military responses to terrorism have only been successful in intra-state conflicts and in states that practice repression with little concern for human rights and civil liberties. Moreover, an army, navy and air force are not designed, organized, trained or equipped to fight non-military adversaries. The most effective counter-terrorist operations involve intelligence collection and analysis, covert operations, infiltration, psychological tactics, criminal prosecutions and negotiations.

The U.S. Invasion of Iraq

When President Bush announced the new National Security Policy of the United States on 17 September 2002 he was laying the groundwork for war with Iraq. His father, President George H.W. Bush had passed on the opportunity to remove Saddam Hussein from power during the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, and had failed to support rebellions by Shiite and Kurdish Iraqis after the war. In the aftermath of 9/11, the new president seized upon the opportunity to attack Iraq. But lacking direct provocation, the rationale and justifications for war conflicted with Just War principles.

The new Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war encountered immediate international opposition, but with the threat of weapons of mass destruction a coalition of the willing, led by the U.S., was assembled and invaded Iraq. When no weapons of mass destruction were discovered, it became apparent to all that the “timely and accurate intelligence” required to identify an imminent threat was seriously flawed. Saddam Hussein had cleverly deceived and hoodwinked the Americans into invading his country, killing his sons and removing him from power.

After 12 years of harsh economic sanctions that resulted in tens of thousands of Iraqi deaths and repeated air attacks on Iraqi air defenses while imposing a no-fly zone over Northern and Southern Iraq, the Americans were surprised that the Iraqi people did not greet them as liberators. Equally disturbing has been the international fallout from the Bush doctrine. By attempting to redefine the principles of Just War, the U.S. has cast doubt over its motives and intentions.

At the heart of the debate is the assurance from President Bush that, “The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.” Critics argue that, absent any reasonable threat of WMDS, or any proven terrorist connections, the Iraq invasion was aggression. Meanwhile, apologists claim that the Iraqis are better off without Saddam, and that the world is a safer place. However, neither of these arguments addresses the Just War principles. The fact is that however demented and demonic the Iraqi leader, he had no capability to strike America, neither WMDs, or the means to deliver them,

The unfortunate result is that America has lost a good deal of its international prestige, credibility and moral authority for future military endeavors. This will undoubtedly have serious future consequences in other situations where preemptive military action may be more justified, and in cases where humanitarian intervention is contemplated. Most immediately there is the problem of genocide in western Sudan. (Humanitarian intervention is itself a difficult ethical concept, discussed in more detail in a separate section.)

To compound the ethical problems in Iraq, U.S. military forces engaged in abuse and torture of Iraqi prisoners – the Abu G’raib prisoner debacle. Such actions violate the Geneva Conventions, a series of international agreements intended to establish and maintain standards of ethical and humane conduct during wartime.

The Geneva Conventions

There are actually four Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949 and two Protocols added in 1977.

Convention No. 1 addresses the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Sets forth the protections for members of the armed forces who become wounded or sick. Convention I

Convention II addresses the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea Convention II

Convention III addresses the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva and establishes the rights of prisoners of war. Convention III

Convention IV addresses the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva. Convention IV

Protocol I relates to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and affords protection of the victims of wars against racist regimes and wars of self-determination. Protocol I

Protocol II is related to the Proection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts and affords protection to the victims of internal conflicts in which an armed opposition controls enough territory to enable them to carry out sustained military. Protocol II

The Geneva Conventions and protocols are reasonably self-explanatory, if lengthy, and are based on common sense and principles of decency and respect. Complications arise, however, when one party to a conflict has not signed and ratified the agreements, or refutes the terms and conditions. The conventions were drafted and approved by governments of states, not dissidents, or rebels; hence the terms favor the side that writes the rules. But even states don’t necessarily accept these rules. For example: states acknowledge the requirement to protect civilians during armed conflict, but in recent decades civilian deaths and casualties have grown to exceed those of the military forces. These civilian casualties are referred to as collateral damage, a “regrettable but unavoidable consequence of warfare.” Likewise, military forces regularly deploy landmines for force protection, leaving a lethal legacy to civilians for decades.

The use of spies, covert operators disguised as locals, or snipers defy the purpose of the conventions and can deny the subject individuals the protections of the conventions. States often impose collective punishment against civilian populations, either directly or indirectly, denying food, water, shelter, and medical care to non-combatants, while some attack civilians intentionally to destroy support for their adversaries and turn populations against those adversaries. Despite resorting to these unethical practices, states often demand protection under the same conventions they have violated and demonize adversaries for their transgressions.

Perhaps no issue defines the moral dilemma better than torture, widely practiced and universally condemned – until that moment when torture offers the hope of revealing an enemies plans and intentions. Even the most liberal societies, faced with the opportunity to save lives find the rationalizations to engage in torture.

Recently, U.S. Senator Joseph Biden stated the key argument against inhuman treatment, “The reason for adhering to the Geneva Conventions is not to protect enemy troops, but to afford those same protections to our own soldiers.” (Sen. Biden’s son was serving in the military at the time.)

"I and the people know What all schoolchildren learn, Those to whom evil is done, Do Evil in return." -W.H. Auden

The debates and arguments are endless and involve virtually every state, or group engaged in armed conflict. It’s often hard to refute the argument that any military force that abides to the letter of the Geneva Conventions will lose the war. In addition, it should be noted that the international community and court of world opinion has a double standard. Liberal democratic Western states are expected to comply with the conventions, while the wanton abuses by authoritarian regimes are all but ignored. Few modern states are as guilty of widespread abuses as Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but they are not alone. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International publish reports on human rights violations that regularly condemn Israel, Turkey and many others for their actions.

The fact is that war is hell. While It is certainly preferable to have standards and strive to attain them, it’s even more important to understand the nature of war and recognize the costs and consequences of war before entering into the fight. To appreciate the nature of war entails studying the basic concepts put forth by such notable war theorists as Sun Tsu, Karl von Clausewitz, Niccolo Machiavelli, Mao Zedong and such contemporaries as USAF Col. John Boyd.

War Theory

The Art of War, by Sun Tsu was the first book to describe the fundamentals of warfare. In recent years, this work has been popularly adapted to describe the essentials of competitive business strategy. The most enduring and most quoted book on warfare is “On War” by Karl von Clausewitz, in which he writes that, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." As such, he argues that political discourse and diplomacy should continue during war and that the hostilities are but another form of expression and influence.

" If we do not learn to regard war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits. In so doing, and in ignoring the fact that they are links in a continuous chain of events, we also ignore the possibility the their possession may later lead to definite disadvantages. This mistake is illustrated again and again in military history."

Definition: War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a War, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance. Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the MEANS; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate OBJECT of hostilities in theory. The Utmost Use of Force: Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy withoutgreat bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War.

However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counter- acting force on each side. This is the way in which the matter must be viewed and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance. He explains that, wars are waged by a "remarkable trinity," comprised of the government, armed services, and people, and cautions that, " No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail."

Although written in the 1800s, von Clausewitz seems to have anticipated the problems that would be faced by today’s modern military, citing three flaws: (1) An "impermissible use of certain narrow systems as formal bodies of law." This pseudo-scientific approach often attempts to "use elaborate scientific guidelines as if they were a kind of truth machine," (2) Overuse of jargon, technicalities, and metaphors, where at times the analyst "no longer knows just what he is thinking and soothes himself with obscure ideas which would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech." (3) Misuse and abuse of historical examples. Here the analyst drags in analogies from remote times and places just to show off his erudition, perhaps without recognizing the dissimilarities. The effect is to "distract and confuse one's judgment without proving anything." The concepts developed in On War include such modern day fundamentals as friction, center of gravity, economy of force, the primacy of defense, and the “sudden powerful transition to the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance." He describes the importance of numerical superiority in general and at decisive, pivotal points and the value of surprise, military morale and political will. Von Clausewitz had a profound influence on warfare up until World War II, and remains a valuable foundation even today. In WWII, Hitler and his armies relied on the fundamental military strategies described by Clausewitz, but failed to accept the political nature of war. After WWI, an new era of warfare emerged. The great powers concentrated on large massed armies, air power and nuclear war. One of the most influential strategists to emerge in this era was USAF Col. John Boyd (“Genghis John”), author of Patterns of Conflict. Meanwhile, revolutionaries like Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Carlos Marigheli developed new strategies whereby smaller guerrilla forces could overcome the numerical superiority of state forces by focusing on the political aspects and consequences of conflict. Guerrilla strategy has become the hallmark of today’s low-intensity conflicts, characterized by insurgency, asymmetric warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and perhaps the final manifestation, Unrestricted Warfare. These topics that impact on today’s events will be discussed in subsequent sections of the Global Focus.

Additional Resources

Following are links to resources on Just War and War Theory, from Sun Tsu to “Genghis” John Boyd:

War Theory and Strategy:

The Art of War
Sun Tsu
http://www.sonshi.com/learn.html
also at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sun-tzu/works/art-of-war/index.htm

On War
Karl von Clausewitz
Online at SONSHI
http://www.sonshi.com/clausewitz.html

Clausewitz Condensed
Patrick M. Cronin
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/clauswtz/clwt-toc.htm

The Seven Books on the Art of War
Niccolo Machiavelli
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/machiavelli/works/art-war/index.htm

On Guerrilla Warfare
Mao-Tse-Tung
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/index.htm

Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla
Carlos Marigheli
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm

Patterns of Conflict
John R. Boyd, 1986
http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf (196 pages)

Just War Theory and Principles:

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm

Just War Theory
http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm

The Philosophy of War
http://www.iep.utm.edu/w/war.htm

Questions of War
Writing’s of St. Thomas Aquinas
http://ethics.acusd.edu/Books/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html

International Humanitarian Law
http://www.genevaconventions.org/